We consider the problem of synthesizing safety strategies for control systems, also known as shields. Since the state space is infinite, shields are typically computed over a finite-state abstraction, with the most common abstraction being a rectangular grid. However, for many systems, such a grid does not align well with the safety property or the system dynamics. That is why a coarse grid is rarely sufficient, but a fine grid is typically computationally infeasible to obtain. In this paper, we show that appropriate state-space transformations can still allow to use a coarse grid at almost no computational overhead. We demonstrate in three case studies that our transformation-based synthesis outperforms a standard synthesis by several orders of magnitude. In the first two case studies, we use domain knowledge to select a suitable transformation. In the third case study, we instead report on results in engineering a transformation without domain knowledge.

Safe and optimal controller synthesis for switched-controlled hybrid systems, which combine differential equations and discrete changes of the system's state, is known to be intricately hard. Reinforcement learning has been leveraged to construct near-optimal controllers, but their behavior is not guaranteed to be safe, even when it is encouraged by reward engineering. One way of imposing safety to a learned controller is to use a shield, which is correct by design. However, obtaining a shield for non-linear and hybrid environments is itself intractable. In this paper, we propose the construction of a shield using the so-called barbaric method, where an approximate finite representation of an underlying partition-based two-player safety game is extracted via systematically picked samples of the true transition function. While hard safety guarantees are out of reach, we experimentally demonstrate strong statistical safety guarantees with a prototype implementation and Uppaal Stratego. Furthermore, we study the impact of the synthesized shield when applied as either a pre-shield (applied before learning a controller) or a post-shield (only applied after learning a controller). We experimentally demonstrate superiority of the pre-shielding approach. We apply our technique on a range of case studies, including two industrial examples, and further study post-optimization of the post-shielding approach.

We study repeated games in which players have imperfect execution skill and one player's true skill is not common knowledge. In these settings the possibility arises of a player "hustling", or pretending to have lower execution skill than they actually have. Focusing on repeated zero-sum games, we provide a hustle-proof strategy; this strategy maximizes a player's payoff, regardless of the true skill level of the other player.

Much work in AI deals with the selection of proper actions in a given (known or unknown) environment. However, the way to select a proper action when facing other agents is quite unclear. Most work in AI adopts classical game-theoretic equilibrium analysis to predict agent behavior in such settings. This approach however does not provide us with any guarantee for the agent. In this paper we introduce competitive safety analysis. This approach bridges the gap between the desired normative AI approach, where a strategy should be selected in order to guarantee a desired payoff, and equilibrium analysis. We show that a safety level strategy is able to guarantee the value obtained in a Nash equilibrium, in several classical computer science settings. Then, we discuss the concept of competitive safety strategies, and illustrate its use in a decentralized load balancing setting, typical to network problems. In particular, we show that when we have many agents, it is possible to guarantee an expected payoff which is a factor of 8/9 of the payoff obtained in a Nash equilibrium. Our discussion of competitive safety analysis for decentralized load balancing is further developed to deal with many communication links and arbitrary speeds. Finally, we discuss the extension of the above concepts to Bayesian games, and illustrate their use in a basic auctions setup.

Much work in AI deals with the selection of proper actions in a given (known or unknown) environment. However, the way to select a proper action when facing other agents is quite unclear. Most work in AI adopts classical game-theoretic equilibrium analysis to predict agent behavior in such settings. This approach however does not provide us with any guarantee for the agent. In this paper we introduce competitive safety analysis. This approach bridges the gap between the desired normative AI approach, where a strategy should be selected in order to guarantee a desired payoff, and equilibrium analysis. We show that a safety level strategy is able to guarantee the value obtained in a Nash equilibrium, in several classical computer science settings. Then, we discuss the concept of competitive safety strategies, and illustrate its use in a decentralized load balancing setting, typical to network problems. In particular, we show that when we have many agents, it is possible to guarantee an expected payoff which is a factor of 8/9 of the payoff obtained in a Nash equilibrium. Our discussion of competitive safety analysis for decentralized load balancing is further developed to deal with many communication links and arbitrary speeds. Finally, we discuss the extension of the above concepts to Bayesian games, and illustrate their use in a basic auctions setup.